Abstract. We consider optimal contracts when a principal has two sources to detect bad projects. The first one is an information technology without agency costs (IT P ), whereas the second one is the expertise of an agent subject to moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability (IT A ). First, we show that the principal does not necessarily benefit from access to additional information and thereby may prefer to ignore it. Second, we discuss different timings of information release, i.e., a disclosure contract offered to the agent after the principal announced the result of IT P , and a concealment contract where the agent exerts effort before IT P is checked. We find that concealment is superior whenever the quality of IT P is sufficiently low. Then, IT P is almost worthless under a disclosure contract, while it can still be exploited to reduce the agent's information rent under concealment. If the quality of IT P improves, disclosure can be superior as it allows to adjust the agent's effort to the updated expected quality of the project. However, even for a highly informative IT P , concealment can be superior as it mitigates the adverse selection problem.
INTRODUCTION

Motivation
With the amount of accessible information increasing constantly, the optimal organization of information aggregation made it to the top of the agenda. While economic theory focused on relationships with a fixed distribution of information for a long time, more recent research has addressed the relation between information structure and optimal mechanism design. Thereby, two research questions seem to be prevalent. How does a change in the information structure influence optimal mechanism design? And does a mechanism designer always benefit from the availability of additional information? A first answer to this question is offered by the linkage principal as introduced in Milgrom and Weber (1982) according to which a principal (or auctioneer) is always better off if he links the contract (or price) to exogenous variables that are affiliated with the agent's (or bidder's) private information. In particular they investigate how affiliated instead of private values (i.e., information of bidders about each other's willingness-to-pay) changes revenue maximizing auction design. They show that open auction formats like the English auction yield higher revenues than closed formats like a second-price sealed bid auction as bidders learn about their own valuations through the published bids of their competitors. Thus, the auctioneer can benefit from additional information available to the bidders if he adjusts the mechanism appropriately.
An obviously related question discussed in the literature on informed principals pioneered by Maskin and Tirole (1990) is whether a principal can benefit in a similar way from additional information available to himself. A key assumption of this literature is that the principal's information is private and non-verifiable. Ottaviani and Prat (2001) relate the value of information in such a setting to the respective value if the principal has access to (verifiable) information that becomes public as soon as he acquires it. In a model of monopolistic price discrimination they show that the principal (the seller) always benefits from additional information as long as it is correlated with the agent's (buyer's) private valuations. For the private information case, they show that it is optimal for the principal to commit to reveal his information before the agent chooses a contract.
We analyze how these results carry over from the pure adverse selection setting to situations that also involve moral hazard. Specifically, we focus on principal-agent relationships where an agent exerts unobservable effort to determine the quality of a project (moral hazard) and reports his findings opportunistically (adverse selection). In addition, the principal has access to information that is correlated to the agent's findings (i.e., correlated to the quality of the project). Such a setting is relevant under many practical circumstances. Initially, our analysis has been motivated by a project concerning scoring systems for small enterprise loans. Loan officers who
Why it Pays to Conceal r 2010 The Authors German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik are supposed to improve and to reveal their own knowledge from relationship lending to their superiors often seem to duplicate the scoring system's result without working seriously. Hence, one may question if committing to run the scoring system (which provides verifiable information) after the loan officer's assessment is better. In a similar way, a doctor's patient, a lawyer's client or a journal editor might consider not to reveal existing expertise or reports to their contractual partner (doctor, lawyer or referee). As a final example, assume an investor or a CEO who decides when to undertake an in-house database research complementary to the (out-sourced) work of a consulting agency.
Model and main results
In our model, a principal owns a project that can be either good or bad. The principal has two possibilities to improve his knowledge about the project's quality. On the one hand, he can use a costless information technology (IT P ) that is not subject to any kind of incentive problem. The technology identifies bad projects with some probability, and the respective signal is verifiable and publicly announced as soon as the principal checks it. On the other hand, the principal can hire an agent (technology IT A ) who detects bad projects with a probability depending on his unobservable effort. After having investigated the project, the agent reports his findings opportunistically to the principal. Hence, engaging the agent is not only subject to moral hazard, but also to a truth-telling (adverse selection) problem. To rule out a trivial franchise solution, the agent is assumed to have zero wealth, such that all payments from the principal to the agent are non-negative. IT A thus resembles a principal-agent problem with moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability.
Our paper addresses two questions. First, we analyze whether access to additional (costless) information can actually harm the principal. Second, we discuss the optimal timing of information release, i.e., whether the principal should commit himself to check (and reveal) IT P before or after the agent exerts effort. The first option will be called a disclosure contract (C D ) and the second one a concealment contract (C C ). The advantage of disclosure is that the principal will hire the agent only if IT P has not detected a bad project as such a project will certainly fail. Furthermore, if the agent is hired, the principal can offer a contract that adjusts the agent's effort to the updated probability of a good project. Both are not possible under concealment. The advantage of concealment, however, is that the principal can use the signal provided by IT P which is correlated with the agent's true findings as a device to reduce the agent's information rent.
Regardless of the contract type, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection forces the principal to pay the agent a positive wage if he reports a good project as well as if he reports a bad project. Paying positive wages if the agent claims 'bad' is necessary to induce effort (moral hazard problem) and paying the agent if he states 'good' is required to prevent that he reports 'bad' without working at all (truth-telling problem). We show how the optimal contract is determined by the tradeoff between rent-reduction and effort selection and derive the following set of results. First, under a disclosure contract, the principal's expected profit is not necessarily increasing in the probability for good projects. This counterintuitive result is driven by the fact that a high percentage of good projects makes it (for any given effort level) unlikely that the agent detects bad projects. This reduces the agent's expected returns to effort, aggravates the moral hazard problem, and increases his incentive to claim that the project is bad without working at all. If these effects dominate, then the principal's profit is decreasing in the probability for good projects. And as this probability increases if IT P has not detected a bad project, an ignorance contract where the principal does not check the (costless) IT P may dominate the optimal disclosure contract.
For the comparison between disclosure and concealment, we identify several factors determining which of the contracts should be chosen. A clearcut result is that concealment dominates whenever the detection quality of IT P is sufficiently small. In these cases, IT P is almost worthless under a disclosure contract, while it can still be exploited to reduce the agent's information rent under concealment. By contrast, disclosure is not always superior when the quality of IT P (i.e., the probability p P with which bad projects are detected) is high. Cost-savings of disclosure increase in p P since the agent is not hired in more cases, but the truth-telling problem also becomes more severe as the agent is more tempted to claim that a project is bad without working at all. Because of these countervailing effects, we show that disclosure is likely to dominate only if the quality of IT P is in an intermediate range -if p P is too low, the advantage of not hiring the agent becomes too small, and if p P is too high, the truth-telling problem is too severe.
Relation to the literature
Principal-agent theory paid considerable attention to the optimal organization of information acquisition by agents (see, e.g., Cremer et al., 1998a Cremer et al., , 1998b , but little has been said about optimal contract design if the principal has access to additional ( private) information. Exceptions include Cremer (1995) who emphasizes the commitment-value of ignorance for a principal who wants to credibly exclude renegotiations, Demski and Sappington (DS, 1987b) and Sobel (1993) who address the question of the principal's optimal timing of information release. Sobel (1993) analyzes a model with a risk-averse agent and demonstrates that the principal prefers to reveal private information after signing a contract to an earlier revelation because in the former case the agent's participation constraint only has to be satisfied in expectation. DS (1987b) is an extension of Demski and Sappington (1987a) that pioneers the literature on delegated expertise. In these models, the principal delegates Why it Pays to Conceal r 2010 The Authors German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik both the information acquisition and a subsequent implementation decision to the agent because communication is prohibitively costly. In DS (1987b) , the agent's unobservable effort in acquiring information is binary, and the optimal (non-binary) implementation decision depends on both the agent's and the principal's information. DS (1987b) provide examples that illustrate the advantages of different timings of information release. The continuous modeling of the agent's effort costs in our paper (see also Laffont and Martimort, 2002) allows to analyze tradeoffs between the costs of implementing truth-telling and selecting an effort level, and to characterize information technologies leading to different optimal timings of information release.
In a recent paper, Gromb and Martimort (GM, 2007) discuss the optimal organization of delegated expertise. While our paper is close to their contribution with respect to the modeling of information and the basic features of the principal-agent relationship, the two papers can be viewed as complements for several reasons. First of all, we do not assume an environment of delegated expertise. The principal bases his investment decision on the available information (IT P or IT A , or both), but decides himself. Second, and more importantly, GM's (2007) focus is on the economies of scale of delegated expertise. In particular, they show that relying on one expert who gathers two signals is inferior to relying on two experts who acquire one signal each. Our paper takes the 'productiontechnology' of information as given and investigates their optimal exploitation. In particular, we highlight the importance of an appropriate timing of information release which is not discussed in GM (2007) .
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. Section 3 derives optimal contracts for some benchmark cases such as the first best or a pure moral hazard setting without adverse selection. Section 4 continues with optimal contract design for a given timing of information release, while Section 5 analyzes optimal timing options as a function of the informativeness of the principal's signal. Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL
A risk-neutral principal owns a project requiring initial investment outlays of I. The project is of quality q[fg; bg, and it is assumed to be 'good' (q 5 g) with probability p 0 [ð0; 1Þ and 'bad' (q 5 b) with probability (1 À p 0 ). If it is good, it yields return R. If it is bad, it yields 0. The project's expected net return is positive, i.e., p 0 R À I > 0. The principal can base his decision on two information technologies, IT P and IT A .
Principal's technology (IT P )
The principal has costless access to an information technology (IT P ) that sends a signal s P [fg; bg. If s P 5 b, the project is certainly bad (i.e., 
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German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik Prðs P ¼ bjq ¼ gÞ ¼ 0), and bad projects are detected with probability p P [ð0; 1Þ (i.e., p P ¼ Prðs P ¼ bjq ¼ bÞ). If the signal is s P 5 g, the probability of success is updated to
We will refer to p P as the quality or informativeness of IT P . There is no incentive problem with IT P , and we assume that the signal is verifiable and becomes common knowledge when the principal checks the IT.
Agent's technology (IT A )
The principal can hire a risk-neutral agent who exerts unobservable effort to detect bad projects. Let e( p A ) be the effort costs required to identify a bad project with probability p A . These assumptions ensure convexity of the principal's optimization problem, and in particular uniqueness of the optimal effort level or signal quality. After having detected a bad project or not, the agent sends a verifiable message m[fg; bg to the principal. As the agent's findings are private information, the message may not be truthful. The agent's reservation utility is normalized to 0, and he is protected by limited liability in the sense that his wage must be non-negative in each state of the world.
Contracts
The game starts at date t 5 0 with a contract offer C by the principal. A contract C is a collection (T, a, W). T (timing) is a mapping from the set of verifiable events E to the set of orderings over E. Once the contract has been signed, T also depicts the timing of the game. a (investment decision) is a binary choice (invest or not) defined on the set of available verifiable signals at the time of contract enforcement. W (wages) is a mapping from the set of available verifiable signals to R þ 0 . We restrict attention to pure strategies, and we refer to the principal's subgame-perfect equilibrium offers (for a given timing T) as optimal contracts.
Timing
In our setting, the (maximum) set of verifiable events consists of signing a contract (Sign), enforcing the contract (Enf ), checking the principal's signal (IT P ), checking the agent's signal (IT A ), and the investment decision (Inv). If the principal does not hire the agent, the obviously optimal timing is the Why it Pays to Conceal r 2010 The Authors German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik sequence TðIT P ; InvÞ ¼ fIT P ; Invg as the signal is informative and costless. This defines the Null contract (denoted by C 0 ). If the principal hires the agent, then (Sign) has to be before (IT A ), and (IT A ) before (Enf ). Obviously, the principal's investment decision will always take place after all information has been acquired and before the agent is paid.
Hence, we are left with four timing options: T 1 ¼ fSign; IT P ; IT A ; Inv; Enf g, T 2 ¼ fIT P ; Sign; IT A ; Inv; Enf g, T 3 ¼ fSign; IT A ; IT P ; Inv; Enf g and T 4 ¼ fSign; IT A ; Inv; Enf g. For T 1 , the principal will only implement a positive effort level if s P 5 g as the projects is certainly bad for s P 5 b. Similarly, the principal will not hire the agent if s P 5 b under T 2 . Hence, there is no difference between T 1 and T 2 if s P 5 b. Moreover, the agent's participation constraint holds under T 1 if and only if it also holds under T 2 (i.e., gives a weakly positive expected utility to the agent if s P 5 g). Finally, IT P is verifiable and becomes common knowledge such that the agent faces the same incentive compatibility and truth-telling constraints under T 1 and T 2 if s P 5 g. Hence, T 1 and T 2 are equivalent for a risk-neutral agent and it suffices to consider T 2 , T 3 and T 4 . We will refer to a contract with timing T 2 as a Disclosure Contract C D . A contract with timing T 3 is called a Concealment Contract (C C ). Finally, T 4 defines an Ignorance Contract (C I ).
Investment decision
The principal's investment decision (a) is a mapping from the set of (available) verifiable information to the set {i, n} where i denotes the decision to invest and n not to invest. For instance, if the principal chooses to use IT P and IT A , his investment decision is a mapping a : fg; bg Â fg; bg ! fi; ng.
Wages
Finally, a contract specifies (weakly positive) transfers to the agent contingent on the feasible verifiable information, i.e., the signals by the information technologies and the result of the project in case of investment. For instance, if the principal checks IT P and IT A and the signal configuration suggests investment, wages are a mapping W : fg; bg Â fg; bg Â fg; bg ! R þ 0 denoted by Wðs P ; s A ; qÞ where the first argument depicts the result of IT P , the second IT A , and the last whether the project was successful or not. If the principal decides to ignore some sources of information, feasible wage schemes are defined accordingly. We denote the agent's expected utility by U and the principal's expected profits by F.
BENCHMARKS
We start by investigating three benchmark contracts, the Null Contract C 
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Null contract
If the principal does not to hire the agent, he will check IT P before he decides upon investment. Optimal actions, transfers and profits are depicted in the following lemma.
Proof. For proofs see Appendix A.
Of course, the principal invests if and only if s P 5 g. In this case, expected returns are p P R, investment costs are I, and profits increase in the quality of IT A measured by p p .
First best
In the first best (C F ), the principal checks IT P and uses IT A if and only if s P 5 g. Then, he maximizes
Note that IT A is only checked if s P 5 g. Moreover, the assumptions on e( p A ) guarantee that p F A > 0 in this case. Hence, the first best contract is of disclosure type.
Pure moral hazard
To distinguish the impact of moral hazard and truth-telling, we assume in this section that the agent's findings are observable and verifiable. 
Ignorance
If the principal does not check IT P and hires the agent, observability of s A implies that he invests if and only if s A 5 g. Hence, an ignorance contract specifies Wðg; qÞ for q[fg; bg and W(b). For such a contract, the agent's utility 1. We denote optimal transfers, actions and equilibrium profits for C 0 by superscript 0. 2. We denote optimal transfers, actions and equilibrium profits for C F by superscript F. 3. Optimal contracts, actions, transfers and profits for the pure moral hazard case are denoted by a tilde ðeÞ. 
Why it Pays to Conceal
The agent will always be hired as his marginal disutility from effort is zero at p A ¼ 0. As the agent's incentive-compatibility constraint (2) is the only non-trivial constraint, and as payments contingent on successful projects do not influence his effort, the optimal contract offers compensation only for the detection of bad projects. The principal's profit as depicted in (iv) consists of the returns on investment ðp 0 R À IÞ, the benefits from hiring the agent (ð1 À p 0 Þe p 
Disclosure
If the principal checks IT P before the agent signs a contract, he will not hire him for s P 5 b. Hence, we can restrict attention to s P 5 g. The agent's expected utility and his ICC can then be elicited from (1) and (2) by substituting p P (the updated success-probability) for p 0 , and by specifying transfers as follows. The principal pays nothing if s P 5 b, pays Wðg; g; gÞ if 
A comparison of Lemmas 2(i) and 4(i) shows that the effort chosen in the pure moral hazard case is smaller than in the first-best solution. Moreover, equilibrium efforts in the disclosure contract are lower than in the ignorance contract as ð1 À p P Þ < ð1 À p 0 Þ. Finally, the principal is strictly better off by checking IT P in advance than by ignoring it as e F D is monotone increasing in p P , and as an ignorance contract resembles p P 5 0. 
As in the optimal ignorance and disclosure contracts, the agent is only compensated for the detection of bad projects. Note that any combination of the respective wages Wðg; bÞ and Wðb; bÞ fulfilling (4) can be part of the optimal contract. The optimal signal quality e p C is smaller than e p D as ð1 À p P Þ > Prðs P ¼ gÞð1 À p P Þ ¼ ð1 À p 0 Þð1 À p P Þ.
Endogenous timing
For the pure moral hazard case, an inspection of the respective efforts and profits yields the following comparison of the three different contract types.
Proposition 1 shows the following tradeoff between the marginal benefits of effort implementation and an efficient use of IT P . First, recall from Lemmas 3(i), 4(i) and 5(i) that marginal costs of effort implementation are identical for the three contract types -they consist of the marginal effort costs themselves (e 0 ðp A Þ) and the marginal agency costs (p A e 00 ðp A Þ). The principal's marginal benefits from the agent's effort, however, differ for the three contract types. In a disclosure contract, marginal benefits are smaller than for ignorance as the agent is only hired if s P ¼ g, so that the probability of detecting bad projects shrinks to ð1 À p P Þ < ð1 À p 0 Þ). In a concealment contract, marginal benefits are further reduced as the agent provides valuable information only if he detects a bad project which has not been detected by IT P (which happens with probability ð1 À p 0 Þð1 À p P Þ < ð1 À p P Þ). This effect drives part (i) and if it were for marginal benefits alone, ignorance would dominate disclosure, and disclosure would dominate concealment.
However, the three contract types make different use of IT P for the hiring and the investment decision. Under disclosure and concealment contracts, the principal invests for the same signal configurations such that these policies only differ in the hiring decision. As the agent is hired too often under concealment (in particular if s P 5 b), disclosure is less costly than concealment. Under ignorance, however, the principal invests more into unsuccessful projects than under disclosure and concealment, and he hires the agent as often as under concealment. Taking both effects (marginal benefits of effort and use of IT P ) into account disclosure obviously outperforms concealment. Moreover, Proposition 1(ii) demonstrates that the latter effect dominates when comparing ignorance and disclosure.
OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
We now consider the complete model with unobservable findings (adverse selection). Lemma 6 streamlines the analysis. Lemma 6 implies that the agent's and principal's optimization program is identical to the pure moral hazard situation except for truth-telling constraints.
Ignorance
If the principal does not check IT P and hires the agent, Lemma 6 implies that he invests if and only if s A 5 g. Hence, a contract specifies transfers Wðg; qÞ for q[fg; bg and WðbÞ. The agent's utility is as in (1), and the ICC is identical to (2). Finally, the agent reports truthfully after spending effort eðp A Þ if this weakly dominates not working at all and always reporting s A ¼ g, i.e., if Uðp A ÞZp 0 Wðg; gÞ þ ð1 À p 0 ÞWðg; bÞ ð 5Þ
and not working at all and always reporting s A ¼ b, i.e., if
Note that the right-hand side of (5) 
In addition to pay for the detection of bad projects, the principal must now pay for reporting good projects due to the truth-telling constraint (6). Otherwise, the agent would always report that he has detected a bad project. In an optimal contract, the truth-telling constraint is binding. Note that the principal pays positive wages if message m ¼ g is sent only if the project is successful as this relaxes the ICC. Since the truth-telling constraint increases marginal costs of effort implementation, the principal implements a lower effort, so that we have p 
Disclosure
As in the pure moral hazard case, the principal does not hire the agent if s P ¼ b.
Hence, a disclosure contract again specifies Wðg; g; gÞ, Wðg; bÞ and Wðg; g; bÞ. 
Why it Pays to Conceal
For the same reasons as in the optimal ignorance contract, the principal offers compensations only if the agent reports a bad project or if he reports a good project that is successful [see (ii)]. As in the pure moral hazard case, marginal benefits of effort are lower for disclosure than for ignorance as the probability of bad projects shrinks from ð1 À p 0 Þ to ð1 À p P Þ. However, marginal costs of effort implementation now differ. An inspection of Lemma 7(iv) and Lemma 8(iv) reveals that agency costs due to limited liability and truth-telling for the optimal ignorance contract [e 0 ðp A Þ=ð1 À p 0 Þ] are smaller than agency costs for the optimal disclosure contract [e 0 ðp A Þ=ð1 À p P Þ]. The smaller the probability of a bad project [i.e., the probability to get compensated with W I ðbÞ or W D ðg; bÞ], the more tempting is the option to always announce m 5 b (getting this compensation for sure). Therefore, the update from p 0 to p P in the disclosure contract does not only reduce E. Feess et al. Þ½ð1 À p 0 Þð1 À 2p P Þ=ð1 À p P Þ 2 is the marginal cost of effort implementation. While the first two terms are strictly positive, the third one is negative for p P > 1=2, and this effect may then dominate in cases where the agent's effort is relatively cheap. Then, cost savings due to not hiring the agent are small and costs are mainly driven by the implementation of truth-telling. In such a situation, a higher percentage of good projects can be harmful to the principal.
8 Hence, dF=dp P is ambiguous.
Concealment
By definition of a concealment contract, the signal is checked after the agent's report. Given Lemma 6, any concealment contract specifies transfers Wðg; g; gÞ, Wðg; g; bÞ, Wðg; bÞ, Wðb; gÞ and Wðb; bÞ. The agent's expected utility is given by (3) and the agent's ICC is (4). To prevent that the agent always claims that the project is good, 
In a concealment contract, the principal uses IT P as a signal for the agent's findings and pays him for the detection of bad projects if and only if s P ¼ b. Comparing Lemmas 5(i) and 9(i) shows that the marginal returns to effort ð1 À p 0 Þð1 À p P ÞI are the same as in the pure moral hazard case. Marginal costs of effort implementation, however, increase due to the binding truth-telling constraint (see the right-hand-side of Lemmas 5(i) and 9(i)). For concealment, the increase in agency costs due to truth-telling is strictly smaller than for disclosure and ignorance as the signal provided by IT P can be used more effectively to reduce the agent's information rent.
OPTIMAL TIMING OF INFORMATION RELEASE
Inferiority of the null contract
An inspection of the respective first-order conditions shows that the principal is always better off by a disclosure or concealment contract than by not hiring the agent.
This follows immediately from the assumption that e 00 ðp A Þ ¼ 0 for p A ¼ 0 so that both marginal effort costs and marginal agency costs are zero for vanishing signal quality.
Inferiority of ignorance
As IT P is costless for the principal, one could conjecture that it can never be optimal to ignore this signal. In fact, the optimal ignorance contract is always inferior to concealment. However, as stated in the following proposition, ignorance may be superior to disclosure.
For part (i) of the proposition, recall that concealment already dominated ignorance in the pure moral hazard case. The truth-telling problem only reinforces this result as the increase in costs of effort implementation due to the binding truth-telling constraint is smaller under concealment. Comparing with disclosure [see (ii) and (iii)] is more subtle due to the non-monotonicity of F D in p P (see the discussion of Lemma 8(v)). As lim 
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German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik Lemma 8(v)]. As already argued in the discussion of Lemma 8(v), dF D =dp P can be negative for p P sufficiently small, though, which implies F D < F I in a neighborhood of p P ¼ 0. If the effort-cost function is sufficiently flat, then the advantages of disclosure (cost savings from not hiring the agent and effort adjustments to new available information) are less important than the costs of truth-telling which increase in p P . In this case, ignorance is superior to disclosure.
Superiority of disclosure
In the pure moral hazard case, disclosure outperformed all other contract types. The advantage of disclosure compared with concealment is that the agent is not hired if the signal is bad, and that the agent's effort can be adjusted to the updated probability that the project is good. Now, there is a countervailing effect -concealment contracts allow to mitigate the truth-telling problem. In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for the superiority of disclosure.
Proposition 3. Suppose p 0 < 1=4 and
Comparing disclosure with concealment is difficult as the optimal signal qualities are different. To get clear-cut results for the superiority of disclosure, we therefore rely on cases where disclosure outperforms concealment even if the principal suboptimally implements the signal quality p C A that is optimal in a concealment contract also in a disclosure contract. The profit difference between disclosure and concealment then consists only of two terms. First, eðp A Þð1 À Prðs P ¼ gÞÞ ¼ eðp A Þð1 À p 0 Þp P expresses the more efficient use of IT P . This term is increasing in p P and captures the intuitive advantage of disclosure for informative (high p P ) technologies. The second term,
is the difference in the costs of effort implementation. For p 0 > 1=4 this term is negative such that disclosure can only be superior due to adjusted effort selection. For p 0 < 1=4, however, this contribution is positive around a local maximum at some p P [ð0; 1Þ (i.e., in the interval in the proposition). Intuitively, if p P is low, a disclosure contract can merely do better than ignorance, but ignorance is known to be inferior to concealment [see Proposition 2(i)]. Furthermore, we know from the discussion of Lemma 8 and Proposition 2(iii) that the benefits of disclosure are small if a mitigation of the truth-telling
Why it Pays to Conceal r 2010 The Authors German Economic Review r 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik problem is important, and this truth-telling effect becomes more severe when p P increases. This leads to an increasing relative profitability of concealment when p P grows, and suggests that concealment can be optimal when IT P is sufficiently uninformative or sufficiently informative.
Superiority of concealment
The fact that concealment can be optimal for small and for large values of p P is summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. (i)
There is always an e > 0 such that
(ii) Suppose that p 0 > 1=4 or p 0 < 1=4 together with either
Part (i) of the proposition expresses that concealment is optimal whenever IT P is sufficiently uninformative. This builds on a familiar result from the literature on contracting under limited liability. Even if the stochastic signal is almost uncorrelated with the agent's performance ( p P close to zero), it remains a tool to reduce the agent's information rents. The advantage of disclosure, however, disappears for p P ! 0 as the agent is always hired and the implemented effort cannot be adjusted.
Part (ii) complements Proposition 3. If the informativeness of IT P measured through p P is not within the range depicted in Proposition 3, part (ii) shows that concealment is superior whenever the truth-telling problem is sufficiently pronounced. If the ratio e 0 ðp A Þ=eðp A Þ is large for all p A , then it will in particular be large in equilibrium. Agency costs e 0 ( p A ) are then high compared with pure effort costs e( p A ). But then, the profit difference between disclosure and concealment is mainly driven by the different agency costs and not by an adjusted hiring decision. Thus, concealment contracts reduce costs of effort implementation more effectively than disclosure contracts if p P is either very small or very large -in the former case because disclosure is not substantially better than ignorance, in the latter because truth-telling is easier to fulfill under concealment. Hence, in settings with substantial agency costs [i.e., e 0 ðp A Þ=eðp A Þ large], and either low informativeness ( p P small) or a substantial truth-telling problem ( p 0 and p P large), concealment is superior. 
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed optimal contracts in a model where a principal can improve his knowledge about a project's quality by using two sources, one of them (IT P ) without incentive problems, the other one (IT A ) plagued by moral hazard, adverse selection (truth-telling) and limited liability. We analyzed under which circumstances it is profit maximizing to offer a disclosure contract (IT P is checked beforehand), or a concealment contract (IT P is acquired after the agent reports his findings). We have found that a sufficient condition for the superiority of concealment is that the quality of IT P is small. In this cases, IT P is almost worthless under a disclosure contract, while it can still be exploited to substantially reduce the agent's information rent under concealment. If IT P improves, it is more likely that disclosure is superior as the possibility not to hire the agent and/or to adjust the agent's effort to the updated quality of the project becomes more important. However, increasing the informativeness of IT P also tightens the truth-telling constraint in a disclosure contract, so that concealment can also be superior when IT P is too informative for disclosure to perform well.
From a practical point of view, our findings first imply that the optimal timing depends crucially on the informativeness of IT P . If, for instance, a bank has a relatively poor scoring system, it should run the automatic analysis only after the loan officer has submitted his report. Second, and maybe less intuitively, concealment can also prove superior if the automatic scoring system is sufficiently precise but it is very costly to make the agent work hard and to achieve truthful reporting. Both results suggest a closer look at the common practice of directly revealing automatic scoring results and subsequently contracting with a loan officer. In cases without a pronounced truth-telling problem, an immediate disclosure of existing information proves useful. We also show that a principal does not necessarily benefit from new information if the agency problem at hand includes both moral hazard and adverse selection unless he offers a contract with a tailor-made timing of information acquisition. This complements earlier findings by Lewis and Sappington (1991) and Kessler et al. (2005) who emphasize the potential welfare (and profit) losses in principal-agent relationships due to additional information for a given timing of information release.
In our model, we assume that bad signals are perfectly informative for both technologies IT P and IT A . While this assumption captures central features of some applications like auditing (for environmental protection, for instance, an expertise usually detects negligent firms -i.e., bad projects) or simple credit scoring (the system identifies non-trustworthy borrowers), it seems not very appealing for other fields like, for example, consultancy or scientific reviewing processes. In a companion working paper (Feess et al., 2004) , we assume that a good (bad) signal increases (decreases) the (ex post) probability of a good project. This modeling obviously contains the model used in this paper as a special case. While the superiority of concealment for almost uninformative 
APPENDIX A
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are straightforward. The proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 and Proposition 1 proceed analogously to the proofs of Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 and Proposition 2, respectively. Detailed proofs can be found in the Appendix of the working paper version (Feess et al., 2006) . 
, dp A =dWðg; bÞ ¼ À1 À p 0 = e 00 ðp A Þ and dp A =dWðbÞ ¼ 1 À p 0 =e 00 ðp A Þ [the last two results are applications of the Implicit Function Theorem to (2)]. To solve system (A1) observe first that l Wðg;bÞ ¼ 0 [a necessary requirement for Wðg; bÞ > 0 implies that l TT > 0] is fully determined by @L=@Wðg; bÞ ¼ 0. This implies l WðbÞ > 0 as otherwise @L=@WðbÞ ¼ 0 could not be fulfilled. But then WðbÞ ¼ 0 such that the incentive-compatibility constraint cannot be fulfilled for a positive signal quality. Therefore, we will assume W I ðg; bÞ ¼ 0 from now on, and suppose that @L=@Wðg; bÞ ¼ 0 is solved by an appropriate choice of l Wðg;bÞ > 0. Now suppose Suppose now that either Wðb; gÞ or Wðg; g; bÞ are strictly positive (and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier is thus zero). Then l TT is fully determined by ð@L=@Wðb; gÞ ¼ 0Þ or ð@L=@Wðg; g; bÞ ¼ 0Þ, respectively. Inserting such a l TT into @L=@Wðb; bÞ and @L=@Wðg; bÞ implies l Wðb;bÞ > 0 (i.e., Wðb; bÞ ¼ 0) and l Wðg;bÞ > 0 (i.e., Wðg; bÞ ¼ 0) -which violates ICC. Hence, we get W C ðg; g; bÞ ¼ W C ðb; gÞ ¼ 0. This given, Wðg; g; gÞ has to be strictly positive to satisfy (12) which means that l Wðg;g;gÞ ¼ 0 such that @L=@Wðg; g; gÞ ¼ 0 implies l TT ¼ 1 (i.e., the truth-telling constraint is binding). Inserting l TT ¼ 1 into @L=@Wðg; bÞ ¼ 0 and @L=@Wðb; bÞ ¼ 0 shows that both equations can be solved simultaneously for weakly positive Lagrange multipliers if and only if l Wðg;bÞ > 0 (i.e., Wðg; bÞ ¼ 0) and l Wðb;bÞ ¼ 0 with ICC e 00 ðp A Þ þ e 0 ðp A Þ ¼ ð1 À p 0 Þð1 À p P ÞI [see (i)]. Wðb; bÞ > 0 is therefore determined by incentive compatibility in (4) [see (ii)]. Part (iii) follows from the satisfied truth-telling constraints and the nature of the signal. Part (iv) follows from inserting the transfers as specified in (ii) into the principal's profit function, and this yields (v) dF=dp P ¼ ð1 À p 0 Þð1 À p A Þ > 0. &
Proof of Lemma 10. Parts (i) and (ii). First observe that F
But as Lemmas 8(i) and 9(i) and the assumptions on eðpÞ imply that p ( 
A sufficient condition for this expression to be positive is 1 À p P À Prðs P ¼ gÞ 1 À p P > 0 which holds whenever
For this interval to be a non-empty, non-degenerate, connected subset of ð0; 1Þ, p 0 has to be smaller than 1/4 -for p 0 ¼ 1=4 the condition shrinks to p P ¼ 2=3 and in the limit p 0 ! 0 the interval becomes (0, 1 
